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A Descriptive Theory of Justice
LERoY MARCEAU*

For the purposes of a purely descriptive science, it is helpful
to conceive of the field of law as determined by the extra-legal
matters which law exists to control. There are fundamentally
two such matters,-both of them being faculties or aspects of the
mind,-conation and affection.' For practical purposes it is almost correct to refer to them as the mental aspects of "act" and
"sensation." This requires a word of explanation.
Because the individual prefers to experience certain sensations rather than others, he is led to prefer one event rather than
another in the world about him. Thus far we have a psychological condition rather than a legal problem. But, in such cases, it
frequently happens that a different individual, in the same way,
prefers a different event. If the two events are incompatible,
the situation involves a corresponding incompatibility between
the desires of the two individuals, and may conceivably lead to
a conflict in their actions.
It is at this point that the science of law becomes applicable.
If there were no conflicts between desires, there could be no occasion for recourse to legal remedies and indeed, as we might
easily demonstrate, no conceivable application of legal relations.
For such relations merely correlate, and therefore enable us to
predict, the results of conflict. With the advent of conflict, therefore, law enters; and it becomes increasingly important as the
* Regional Attorney for the National Labor Relations Board.

1. While the situation of modern psychology is notoriously confused, it
Is perhaps fair to state that a majority of students, in that field, continue to
go along with Sir William Hamilton in his famous classification of the
human mind into three aspects, as
1. The affective
2. The cognitive
3. The conative

follows:
aspect, or "wishing"
aspect, or "knowing"
aspect, or "striving."

This classification has, of course, been assailed, and at times very violently,
some authorities arguing in effect that the conative aspect (striving) should
not be considered as fundamental-that it is simply the resultant of knowing
and feeling. Such authorities prefer a division simply into the affective and

cognitive aspects. Others believe that the affective aspect (feeling) is not
fundamental, but is itself a resultant of knowing and striving. These
authorities

would

prefer a

classification

confined

to

the

cognitive

and

conative aspects. Still others, and these perhaps the greater number, argue
that, since all three aspects must co-exist, it is meaningless to allege that one
is more or less fundamental than another.
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possibility of conflict expands. That possibility increases, of
course, in proportion to the intensity of the preference in the
individual; and that intensity measures the magnitude or amount
of the well-being involved.
The subject matter of such a conflict may be almost anything-may be, in truth, the content of any human desire which
is intrinsically capable of being affected, either favorably or unfavorably, by the act of another person. The totality of all such
things, all that part of external nature as to the control of which
individuals are actually (or potentially) in conflict, is denoted
by the general term "wealth"-wealth being thus defined as any
subject of conflict between individuals. But, while such a conflict may arise concerning a variety of abstract or immaterial
matters, it will be found convenient for practical purposes, and
not at all misleading or inaccurate, to use concrete physical objects, whenever control over them is desired by more than one
person, as typical examples of wealth.
The social sciences, such as economics and sociology, use the
term "wealth" to describe (1) objects containing qualities which
are especially useful in the satisfaction of human desires; that
is, are inherently capable of producing pleasant rather than unpleasant sensations, and of thereby raising one's well-being; and
(2) objects which persons desire more of than they have. Whenever these two elements co-exist,-a means of satisfying desire,
and a condition of scarcity,-wealth exists. 2 It has therefore been
defined as "scarce means of satisfying desire." This definition
coincides squarely with the one we have adopted in the preceding paragraph for, obviously, human wills never clash over the
control of objects which are intrinsically worthless, or so plentiful that every one can have as much as he wants. But, whereas
these concepts from the social sciences explain how it comes
about that human beings compete for control over these particular objects, jurisprudence simply begins with the competition and
declares that, for it, wealth exists whenever individuals are found
3
in conflict.
Historically, it is supposed that the amount of wealth on the
earth has greatly expanded, both from the increase in human
2. "These decisions turn on the meanings of property and scarcity.
Property in law is scarcity in economics. If any useful object, such as air
or water, the most useful of all, is so abundant that there is no competition
for its acquisition, then that object does not become property. Rights of
property are asserted and adjudicated only in useful objects that are scarce
or expected to be scarce." Commons, Law: A Century of Progress (1935) 341.
3. "It is not in respect of every physical object that, at any given time,
the law cares to exercise control, and to prescribe rules and conditions of
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desire itself and from a progressive scarcity-not that articles
have become less numerous, but rather that the increase of population has always outrun the increase in useful objects. It has
been pointed out that in a condition of absolute plenty, an earthly
paradise, the absence of the scarcity element would completely
eliminate the concept of wealth. It is probably true that, in primitive society, food and shelter constituted the sole articles which
were both sufficiently useful and sufficiently scarce to be so
classed. In a condition of advanced civilization, such as the earth
now enjoys, the mounting desires of men and the increasing
density of population have made practically everything on earth
(except air, sunlight, water and a few other bounties of nature)
the objects of competition, and therefore articles of wealth. Thus
does the field of law broaden and lengthen out with each succeeding generation.
I
Not to lose ourselves in the contemplation of history, let us
return to our thesis that the subject matter of conflict between
individuals constitutes economic wealth, and that the task of
resolving such conflict is the function of law. This task at the
outset appears extraordinarily difficult, since the conflicts which
can arise between men are almost infinite, both in complexity and
in extent. No two men have the same history, the same natural
abilities or the same outlook. The millions of our fellow creatures
stand in a myriad differing lights, all changing from day to day,
and from hour to hour. The near infinite complexity of phenomena, coupled with the near infinite variety in human beings
themselves, seems to carry over into an infinity of sources of
conflict between individuals, and so to result in hopeless complexity.
Within the present century, however, a great advance has
been made, primarily through the genius of Wesley Hohfeld and
Alfred Kocourek. Just as chemistry has succeeded in breaking
appropriation. The purpose of the law's interference is to arrest interminable
competitions, and to promote security by regulating distribution. But it
depends upon the actual circumstances of a community, and upon the stage
of its social progress, whether certain classes of things are or are not
comprehended in the list of things as to which ownership is possible. For

instance, in very primitive times, whether the community be pastoral or
agricultural, the economical value of land is so extremely small, that it

is

only when family life has already become highly organized that land is a
topic of laws of ownership. Indeed, so long as the population is small, the
needs of it limited, and the quantity and choice of land indefinitely large, it

is not possible that any idea of appropriation sufficiently fixed to afford a
basis for law can, by possibility, exist." Amos, The Science of Law (1896) 162.
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down all material substances into ninety-two elements (and ultimately into eight families of elements); so has jurisprudence
succeeded in breaking down all possible legal relationship (between individuals) into eight basic forms. The importance of this
work taxes the imagination and is only now, a generation after
its presentation, coming to be realized throughout the world.
In a few brief paragraphs we shall endeavor to describe these
basic patterns.
As a preliminary to our understanding of the eight basic
legal forms, or "legal relations" as they will hereafter be referred
to, observe that no matter what the attendant circumstances may
be, whatever conflict exists between any two individuals may be
resolved in favor of one individual if the other individual acts
in conformity with his preference. The law may therefore resolve
the conflict by requiring the one party so to act. For this reason
the legal relation between any two individuals can be reduced
to one of two positions of dominance enjoyed by the one party.
These two positions are respectively (1) the authority of the
dominant party to require the other individual to act in accord
with the preference of the dominant party, and (2) the authority
of the dominant party to control, i.e., to create or to terminate,
the foregoing relation.
In proceeding to discuss and to analyze legal relations, we
nology the dominant aspect of a legal relationship is called an
"authority," and the servient aspect is called a "responsibility."
Inasmuch as there are two positions of dominance, there are two
basic types of "authority" and, therefore, two corresponding types
of responsibility. This situation can be graphically depicted by
outlining the general authority-responsibility relationship in a
diagram, as follows:
f Claim
AuthorityI Power

-

Duty
Liability

1

Responsibility

The precise meaning of this general relationship, and of the
separate relationships into which it may be sub-divided, will now
be investigated.
One individual may, and frequently does, "prefer" that some
other individual perform a particular (positive or negative) act.
In such a case, if the act is, in fact, performed, the individual
who preferred it will have his preference satisfied and will thereby receive a certain amount of well-being-over and above the
well-being he would have enjoyed without regard to the act.

354
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It sometimes happens (we will hereafter endeavor to learn when
it happens) that the individual is certain to receive this enhancement in his well-being, either (1) because the act will, in fact,
be performed or (2) because, if the act is not performed, in some
other way the precise amount of well-being will be shifted from
4
the prospective actor.
Jurisprudence describes this situation by stating that the
individual who stands in this fortunate position has "an authorifty to require" that the act be performed. Hence arises our definition of one of the eight basic legal forms: a claim is an authority to require an act of another.
If the situation were to be described from the standpoint of
the servient party (the individual who must either perform the
act or forfeit a definite amount of well-being [i.e., must suffer
pain]) jurisprudence would say that the servient party is under
"a responsibility to perform" the act at the behest of the dominant party. This condition is denominated a "duty." 5 Hence arises
the definition of the second basic legal form: a duty is a responsibility to perform an act at the behest of another."
It is now accepted practice among all authorities on juris4. This "shift of well-being" is the ultimate reality upon which law is
based; and it, be it observed, is a mental phenomenon. Thus law is essentially
a mental, rather than a physical, science.
"There is nothing in law which could be called natural in the sense of
existing as a legal phenomenon independently of the emotional human
valuation behind it, or absolute in the sense of existing everywhere and
always. There is no exterior reality, no absolute fact, no natural relation,
which by itself could necessarily enter into the system of the law, or could
have any legal significance merely because of its experimental existence, or
could become what might be called 'legal reality'." Nekam, Personality
Conception of the Legal Entity (1938) 8.
5. In purely theoretical work, where public understanding is not an
object of pursuit, it is preferable to designate a servient or correlative
relation by a special symbol, rather than by a separate name. For this
purpose the mathematical sign of the inverse function "1" is sometimes
used. Thus, the correlative of a claim, instead of being called a "duty" is
called a "claim-"'; and -a liability-which term we will hereafter define-is
called a "power-'." In this system the negative relations are indicated by the
Thus, the absence of a power,
mathematical sign of negation or falsity "-."
now sometimes referred to as a disability, would be called a ",--'power."
6. "It may be quickly acknowledged that legal duties are not objective
realities in a physical sense. The existence of a legal duty can never be
directly and immediately demonstrated. It is purely a mental construct. Its
present existence, while never verifiable during its assumed existence is,
however, perfectly demonstrated by the regular, though not absolutely
constant, phenomena which follow behavior inconsistent with the idea of
duty. No other explanation for these phenomena can be given which will
meet the test of a strictly scientific procedure." Kocourek, Legal Duties
(1939) 13 Temple L.Q. 151, 164.
7. Some writers, however, still speak of the possibility of a duty existing
without any corresponding right in another. See Korkunov, General Theory
of Law (1922) 211.
"Every right supposes, necessarily, a corresponding obligation. If the
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prudence to speak of the "claim-duty" relationship as one indivisible situation.8 A compound name has been conferred upon the
relationship' for reasons purely of convenience, since it is helpful
to call it a claim when we view it from the standpoint of the
dominant party and, conversely, to call it a duty when we view
it from the standpoint of the servient party.
In one sense the exact legal status of any individual can be
completely described in terms of his claim-duty relationships.
For these relationships determine whether, in deciding for or
against the commission of any act, he may consult his own preference or must follow the preference of another. But, while such
a description would be correct at any given moment, it does not
reveal the mechanism by which one's jural status changes from
time to time. In order to explain these changes or, in other words,
to add a time dimension, it is necessary to supplement the claimduty relationship by a relationship of a different type.
There are some claim-duty relationships which may be
changed by the act of one of the parties; and in such instances
it is obvious that the ability to bring about such a change is a
new type of dominance which the favored party holds over the
other party. This new relationship becomes *thethird basic legal
form, and is denominated a "power."9 Strictly speaking, a power
might be defined as an authority to alter claims, and nothing
obligation does not
But an obligation
This happens when
corresponding right
Thus the obligation

exist, there will be only a permission and not a 'right.'
may sometimes exist without a corresponding right.
the interest which constitutes the subject-matter of the
arises subsequently to it or is temporarily suspended.
not to assail the right of an unborn child corresponds to

no right, since the foetus is not yet a subject of right. The obligation is

here created in expectation
infant to be born."

It

and by way of protection

of the life of the

is submitted, however, that the obligation not to assail an unborn

child may be considered as owed, either to other members of society (such

as the parents) or to the foetus; and that in the latter case, although the
foetus might have no aid from the state nor any ability in itself to enforce
its right, the right would exist and could be defended by a third party.
8. For a continental recognition of this correlation between rights and
litigations, see Del Vecchio, The Formal Bases of Law (1921) R 127.
"This correlation, essential to the notion of rights, shows how every right
has a corresponding duty." See also Id. at f1 129.

9. "Powers, as a matter of fact, take us to a level of legal facts that is
exactly one step higher than the one with which we have been dealing.
Whether or not an asserted demand-right is to be declared by the court
depends on whether certain conditions are present. In most, but not in all
cases, one of those conditions is an apparently purposive human act.
"Not all such acts are the exercise of legal powers. It is the task of the

court to discriminate those acts in which a legal power was exercised from

those in which no power existed." Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld (1938)
51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141, 1157. Quoted in Hall, Readings in Jurisprudence
(1938) 508.
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else. Then we would encounter the necessity of describing in
some way the ability to alter powers. This ability might be
called a "power of the second order." We might then describe
the ability to alter a power of the second order as "a power of
the third order," and so on without end. Such a terminology
would be logical and would have certain theoretical advantages;
but it would be far more complicated than the present development of jurisprudence seems to warrant. In the interest of simplicity, therefore, and following the uniform course of modern
authority, we use the word power to cover all of these situations,
i.e., the ability to alter a claim, a power, a power over a power,
etc. This usage gives rise to the established definition: a power
is an authority to alter the relation of another.
When this new relationship is viewed from the standpoint
of the other party, it is called a "liability.' '10 We can readily cast
this into the form of a definition by stating that a liability is a
responsibility to suffer an alteration of one's relation."
Legal relationships of any kind, like other phenomena in
our universe, are found by experience to fall naturally into a
relatively small number of classes or types, all of the relationships in a given class being of the same, or nearly the same, general form. Thus, many of the relationships encountered in every
day life are similar, one with another, except that they run between different pairs of individuals, the individual claimants and
duty-owers being dissimilar, but the relationships which unite
them being identical. Whenever we encounter a form of relationship which is common to every member of an entire class of
individuals, we describe it as a law-thus implicitly defining a
law 1 2 as a relationship which is common to an entire class of
3
individuals.1
10. Some authorities, notably Salmond, have supposed liability to be the
correlative of privilege, rather than of power. But this view has been
exploded by the investigations of Hohfeld.
See Campbell, Some Footnotes to Salmond's Jurisprudence (1941) 209.
11. Some authorities argue that a liability can exist without any corresponding power. They point out that a personal property claim, for example,

will be terminated if the object is destroyed by natural force rather than by
human act. The owner of such an object can therefore be said to be under
a "liability," although' no person has a "power."

Campbell, op. cit. supra note 10, at 209.
It is submitted that this is purely a question of definition.
12. The definitions usually adopted are varied and, in some cases,
grandiose.
It is really remarkable that the following should all be offered as defi-

nitions of law. Apparently jurists and philosophers reserve the right to give
words any meaning they choose. Thus:
Demosthenes: "That is law, which all men ought to obey for many

reasons, and especially because every law is an invention and gift of the
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Although this meaning of the word "law" may, on first consideration, seem unusual if not strained, a familiar example will
reveal that it is in fact the meaning which we uniformly, if unconsciously, employ in every-day speech. We might say, for instance, that John Wilkes Booth was under a duty to refrain from
killing Abraham Lincoln, and that Lincoln had a claim which
entitled him to require Booth to refrain. This is to state a simple
claim-duty relationship. But this relationship was not peculiar
to Booth and Lincoln. Other men similarly were and are under
duties to refrain from killing their fellow-men. We can, therefore, generalize the situation by grouping in one class all relationships which contain the common concept, a duty on the part
of one man to refrain from killing another. In the stark, descriptive language of statutory law, the concept common to this class
of relationships is expressed directly by saying that "Whoever
kills his fellow-man will be hanged." In the language of jural relationship, it is expressed indirectly by saying that "Every person
is under a duty to refrain from killing any other person." In the
terse, classic language of scripture it assumes its simplest form:
"Thou shalt not kill."
Gods, a resolution of wise men, a corrective of errors intentional and
unintentional, a compact of the whole

state, according to which all men

who belong to the state ought to live."
Cicero: "Law is the highest reason implanted in nature, which prescribes
those things which ought to be done, and forbids the contrary."

Hooker: "A Law is properly that which Reason in such sort defineth
to be good that it must be done."
Grotius: "A rule of moral action obliging to that which is right."
Blackstone: "A rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power

in a state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong."

Amos: "A command proceeding from the supreme political authority of
a state and addressed to the persons who are the subjects'of that authority."

Jhering:
Gareis:

"The sum of the rules of constraint which obtain in a state."
"Law in the objective sense of the term is a peaceable ordering

of the external relations of men and their relations to each other."
Tolstoi:

"Rules established by men who have control of organized power

and which are enforced against the recalcitrant by the lash, prison, and
even murder."
Russian Penal Code, Article 590: "Law is a system of social relationships

which serves the interests of the ruling classes and hence is supported by
their organized power, the state."
Seagle, The Quest for Law (1941) 4.
13. Note that even the most pronounced positivists describe law as a
general rule which may be and is frequently "broken." They conceive of the
law as the "announced purpose" of the state, rather than as a uniformity in
its actual conduct. Thus obsolete statutes are regarded as "laws" even
though they are never enforced.
It is submitted that it would be more in keeping with the practice in the
physical sciences if we were to define law in terms of the uniformity which'
actually does exist, rather than that which the state announces its intent
to sanction. Nothing less than this deserves the name of realism.

Of course, an actual occurrence (an event) in either physical or legal
science must be considered as the resultant of many laws; and cannot be
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II
Under our definition of a claim-duty, such a relationship
exists whenever a proposed act (i.e., a proposed exercise of volition) will be followed by a certain shift of well-being" (i.e., a
certain satisfaction of preference to be enjoyed by the individual
holding the claim rather than by the actor owing the duty).
When the situation is such that this shift will actually occur,
the claim-duty exists whether or not the situation is known.
But if the relationship is to serve as a guide to action, it must be
known to the actor, not after the shift of well-being occurs, but
rather before its occurrence at the time that the act is contemplated and committed. This implies knowledge of a future event
and therefore, as we learn from natural science, is only possible
if, in addition to knowing the present situation, the actor knows
a natural correlation or "law of nature" which unites the present
situation with the future.
Examples of this truth are, of course, innumerable in natural
science. The man who drops a stone knows that it will fall, but
only because, while unaware of the precise formulation, he is
familiar with the substance of the law of gravity. The man who
inflates a pneumatic tire knows that the pressure will increase
and that heat will be generated, but only because he is familiar
with the substance of Boyle's law and of Charles' law: And so
we might continue through countless hundreds of laws of nature
which enable us, upon the basis of present facts, to predict future
phenomena.
An exact knowledge of the correlation between the commission of an act (conation) and the well-being of actor and actee 5
(affection) would, in the same way, enable one to predict precisely how well-being would shift, upon the performance of a
given act: And this would determine whether or not a duty (not
adequately described in terms of any one law. Newton's First Law of Motion,
for example, states that "every body remains in a state of rest or of uniform
motion in a straight line unless it is compelled by impressed force to change
that state." This does not suffice to describe the actual movement of any
body whatever, since all are acted upon by impressed forces. But it is
nonetheless true of all bodies and, in connection with other laws equally
operative, describes their movements with increasing accuracy.
14. If the shift Is brought about by the state, the claim is called a positive
or jural claim; if the shift is brought about by nature generally, the claim
is called a natural claim. This is believed to be the sole basis of distinction.
Marceau, The Relation of Natural to Positive Law (1942) 18 Notre Dame
Lawyer 22.
15. This is the simplest word available to describe the individual who is
affected by the act.
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to perform the act) existed. From this point of view the task of
the jurist appears relatively simple-a mere matter of applying
the correlation to present fact situations.
The history of jurisprudence, however, has not developed
along these lines. It was one time customary in discussions of
legal philosophy to deny that any such correlation between conation and affection existed; and to speak of the search for such
a correlation as the pursuit of fantasy. During the last century,
however, it has become increasingly clear that not only conation
and affection, but any. phenomena whatever, may be correlated;
because such correlation is merely an abstract and generalized
description of the sequence, whatever ft may be, in which the
events follow one another. 6 Where it is possible to make our
generalizations very broad, they can be stated very simply and
made to assume the form of a fundamental law-usually a differential equation. When it is not possible to make our generalizations very broad, they must be stated with much greater complexity, and are frequently so complicated that they cannot, in
practice, be stated at all. But in either event they exist. It is,
therefore, no longer possible to deny that a correlation, such as
we have in contemplation, must be available.
Inasmuch as all minds are essentially alike, it is ordinarily
assumed that this correlation, whatever it may be, is common to
all minds or, at least, to all minds of a certain class. It therefore
exists not only between one individual actor and the person
affected by his particular act, but exists rather between a whole
class of actors, on the one hand, and, on the other, the class of
person affected. The claim-duty relationships which such a correlation indicates are therefore common to an entire class of persons and constitute, within our usual definition, "laws."
The existence of such "laws," however, has not quieted the
fears of those who doubt the feasibility of calculating legal re-.
lations by scientific means. The successors of those who formerly
denied the existence of a correlation between conation and affection now deny that the existing correlation can be known. They
argue that the extreme complexity of social, as contrasted with
material, phenomena makes it impossible for the individual, or
even the race, to formulate the correlation in comprehensible
terms. Limitations in the ability of the human mind, therefore,
16. It is universally assumed that they will continue to follow one
another, on the-same sequence, hereafter. This assumption has been, of
course, the subject of a celebrated controversy since the time of David Hume.
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rather than anything in the nature of the phenomena themselves,
are said to make impractical a true science of law.
In its extreme form, this view is not seriously championed
except as an intellectual pastime. It is quite obvious that men,
when acting, do have (at least on some occasions) a fairly accurate idea of the effect which the act will have on their own
future well-being; so much so, in fact, that one who acted without reference to the future would be considered abnormal. And
because no such idea could exist without a knowledge, to some
extent,' of the correlation between conation and affection, it is
clear that men do have such a knowledge. The fact that men,
by their actions, sometimes bring down unexpected ruin on their
own heads is, of course, proof that their knowledge is partial
rather than complete. So much is clear.
It has therefore become customary for modern authorities to
agree that something is known about the correlation between the
commission of an act and the well-being of the actor; and that
one factor in this correlation, known at the present time, is the
correlation set forth in the statutes and customs of the State
which describe the circumstances under which the public force
will be brought to bear to impose damages upon men who commit
certain acts and to award compensation to those who are injured
by the acts in question.
Such an announced intention, forcibly to produce a shift of
well-being, indicates a probability that well-being will shift, and
therefore, indicates the probable existence of a claim-duty relationship. Because the shift is to be produced by the state, rather
than by some other part of nature, it is customary to call the
relationship (if it 'exists) "positive" or "jural."
Now there are many who believe that the announced intention of the state is the only part of the correlation, between conation and affection, which is sufficiently simple to be known with
any high degree of precision. They therefore conclude that, while
positive law undoubtedly exists, natural law (for finite minds
at least) does not exist. They believe that those who have the
opportunity to shape the positive law may shape it arbitrarily;
that the shifts of well-being which they decree, whatever they
may be, will not thereafter be undone or reversed by any natural
invariant; and that there is accordingly no standard to which
the positive law, in order to accomplish the purpose of its promulgators, need conform.
There are, on the other hand, those who believe that the
entire correlation between conation and affection can be stated-

1945]

A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF JUSTICE

at least approximately-in simple terms, and known' by the average actor. They, therefore, conclude that positive law and natural
law co-exist. They believe that, if the positive law attempts to
shift well-being in a manner inconsistent with the natural correlation, the attempt will ultimately prove unsuccessful; and
that, in this sense, the natural law is a standard to which the
positive law must conform.
We are thus faced with a clear cut issue. Is there or is there
not, a simple correlation between conation and affection? As
philosophers divide on this issue, each of the two conflicting contentions is supported by authorities of World-shaking reputation.
Like so many of the fundamental conflicts in cosmology, the matter is debated with deep feeling and at times with expressions
not the most indulgent or considerate. Those who believe that
the correlation is complex are described at times as "give it up"
philosophers and at other times as "corrupters of the fountain
of knowledge." Those who believe that the correlation is simple
are condescendingly described as "naive" or as the "followers of
an illusion."
III
To the author of the article, all of this heat seems premature.
It appears that the conflict should be settled, as most issues in
science are settled, by a careful formulation of the problem and
an equally careful investigation into the facts. We should first
of all have clearly in mind the precise form of the correlation
under discussion; we should then tabulate the legal relations
which follow from it; and finally, we should proceed empirically
to test whether these relations square with the facts revealed by
experience. Space will not permit us, in this article, to consider
all proposed formulations of the correlation; but we shall endeavor to discuss the possibility of a scientific approach in connection with one of the many forms in which philosophers have
expressed it.
It has been suggested that affection is proportional to conation in the sense that the amount of well-being enjoyed by an
individual (through the satisfaction of his preferences) is directly
proportional to the amount of the effort exerted by him (through
the exercise of his volitions); just as acceleration, in mechanics,
is proportional to impressed force. This is to postulate, in the
field of mental phenomena, a correlation similar to that which
Newton postulated, by his second law of motion, in the field of
physical phenomena. For the purpose of this article, this postu-
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late may be considered as representative of the view of all those
who believe that a simple correlation exists. It is substantially
the view taken by the great religions, and by philosophers of
such divergent outlook as Aristotle, Spinoza and Emerson.
Stating the postulate in terms of "act" rather than the more
general concept "conation," it asserts that every actor will receive a (positive or negative) amount of well-being proportionate
to his exertions; and it provides that every actee will forfeit a
(positive or negative) amount of well-being equivalent to the
amount received in any other fashion. 17 From the postulate we
can therefore deduce when well-being will be forfeited by the
actor and when it will be acquired by the actee. The co-existence of these two conditions by definition constitutes a claimduty relationship. In the following paragraph we will try to
discover the circumstances in which this condition exists.
Unlike the historian of a fixed period, the scientist cannot
"begin at the beginning." He must study phenomena as he finds
them after they have been subjected to countless influences and
counter-influences. He therefore adopts the next best methodhe attempts to study a phenomenon in the simplest form, abstracting from it as many complications as possible and reserving
them for later study so that one thing may be studied at a time.
With a similar goal we shall attempt to study the relations which
would exist (assuming the truth of the postulate) between individuals in a situation simplified by the following provisions:
1. That no state is in existence.
2. That the status of each individual is in equilibrium (i.e.,
he could look forward to neither increase or decrease in
his well-being if the proposed act were not performed).
17. The relation between act and responsibility is so natural that, as
John Dewey has shown, naive persons can't conceive of any other basis.
"In short, in substance although not in form, the reasonable or 'natural'
was identified with the antecedently given, with the state of affairs that
customarily obtained, not with the exercise of intelligence to correct defects
and to bring about better consequences ...
"It would not be difficult to trace the same logic in the denial of the
principle of liability without fault. Under certain conditions, the doctrine is
doubtless reasonable, in the sense in which reasonable means due foresight
of consequences. Under other conditions, where industrial pursuits bring
about different consequences, the doctrine that in pure accident of misadventure it is reasonable for the loss to lie where it falls, is, when laid down as a
dogma, the deliberate identification of the reasonable with the physically
existent, and willful refusal to use intelligence in such a way as to ameliorate
the impact of disadvantage."
Dewey, Nature and Reason in Law (1931). Quoted by Jerome Hall, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 234.
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3. That the effect of the proposed act is completely foreseen
by the actor.
These three conditions are all contrary to fact, and therefore the
result which we obtain in this preliminary study will not immediately reflect the existing relations which we might expect
to meet with in everyday life. In order to present this study in
the most persuasive fashion, it would be necessary to correct
these results by considering the modifications which are introduced by each of the three foregoing factors. But the digression,
interesting and fruitful though it should prove, would not contribute greatly to the thesis here being developed. Rather than
devote space to what is essentially a refinement, it appears wiser
to leave our results incomplete, and open to the invidious description "theoretical."
At an earlier period in the history of jurisprudence it was
customary to cast doubt upon this method of proceeding, and to
insist that man, being naturally a social animal and attended
everywhere with a degree of organization (such as is implied by
the existence of the state), could not properly be studied in any
simpler condition without doing violence to the actual facts."i
This attitude was perhaps a reaction against the extremists of an
earlier period who had implied, or were commonly supposed to
have implied, that these simpler conditions of human relationship (particularly the condition of men prior to the formation of
states and communities), have had a real existence in historic
or prehistoric times. In the present discussion, of course, we
will consider these simpler patterns of relationship from a purely
analytical standpoint, without regard to the question of their
actual existence, or non-existence, as any golden period of the
past or future.
It is hardly necessary to attempt a justification for proceeding in this way, so familiar is the method in the natural sciences.
The first principles of every such science must be expressed in
terms of certain ideal conditions, never met with in experience
and only approximated in the laboratory. It is probably true, for
example, that no actual "body at rest" exists or ever has existed
18. The following quotation is typical of this viewpoint.

"There have been societies of men since the beginning of the existence
of man. To think of man isolated is to think a thing which does not exist,
and which the facts prove never to have existed. Therefore the idea of the
social man is the only possible starting point of juridicial doctrine.
"Consequently, if we suppose the natural man isolated, he cannot have
any rights." Duguit, The Law and the State (1917) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1, quoted

in Hall, op. cit. supra note 9, at 200.
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in any section of the universe: And yet Newton found it advisable to express his famous laws of motion in terms of such an
imaginary "body at rest;" just as he expressed the law of gravitation in terms of the relation which would exist between two
material bodies, if no former acceleration, no friction, no third
body and (what amounts to about the same thing) no space
curvature existed. The results which he obtained, by the application of the law, were then corrected by considering in turn
the effect of past acceleration, friction, third bodies and (in our
time) space curvature: A method which proved so productive,
in explaining the relationship between the physical aspect (or
mass) of two bodies, merits our consideration in the study of the
relationship existing between the mental aspect (or minds) of
individuals.
Let us proceed then to consider the case of two individuals
in what may be called their "normal" positions, before either has,
by his actions, acquired any expectation of receiving pleasure or
pain. The postulate leads us to believe that each will thereafter
receive an amount of well-being proportionate to his own exertion, and that he will not receive any well-being (positive or
negative) apart from his exertion.
Suppose, in this situation, that one individual in accordance
with his own preference performs an act and thereby produces
an effect upon the person of the other, against the will (i.e.,
preference) of the other. -Very clearly, in such case, the act results in an immediate enhancemeit of the actor's well-being, a
sensation of pleasure; and an immediate diminution of wellbeing, or sensation of pain, in the other person. This, in the
popular language of the day, is usually called an "injury." Under
the postulate, the actee or injured party can look forward to
receiving an amount of well-being which will exactly compensate him for his pain; and the actor, having received an advantage, not called for by the postulate, must in the future suffer an
equivalent loss. There will be, in other words, a future "shift"
of well-being from the actor to the injured party.
But this shift of well-being is precisely the criterion which
we have adopted, in our definition, to identify the claim-duty
relationship. We may therefore describe the situation in terms
of relations by saying that the one individual has a claim to exclude the other from affecting his person.19 When this relation19. This is

the

philosophical basis of the argument that slavery, for

example, is always "unjust." Those who dispute this basis ordinarily argue
that slavery, or anything else, may, under certain conditions be entirely just.
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ship is viewed from the standpoint of the other individual, and
thug transposed into terms of duty, we may say that the other
individual has a duty to refrain20 from affecting the person of
the one.21
The foregoing claim-duty relationship covers only the per2
son of the claimant and does not extend to any other object;
"Nothing could be more preposterous, for instance, than to say: at no
stage of human culture has slavery been just. This is the result of the retrograde movement from the historical basis of Hegel back to the non-historical
exposition of Natural Law of Kant. This whole school of thought, including
Neo-Kantianism, may well be buried and forgotten." Kohler, Philosophy of
Law, 26.
20. Some authorities would so define duty as to exclude all duties to
refrain from acting, and would include only positive duties to act-to redress
an injury already inflicted.
"Hence, a claim requires a special relation which has been brought about
as regards this person by virtue of a legal process (Rechtsvorgang). Only if
thus understood is the conception of the claim productive; only thus does it
aid in clarifying the theory of the law.
"2. At the present time, it is, indeed, grossly misunderstood, and no other
term has been more misinterpreted. Most misleading of all are the following

errors:
"(a) The belief that an owner has a 'universal claim' against everyone
,not to be molested.' This is the most unproductive idea possible; a legal
significance attaches in granting a claim when someone has been injured,
a claim that the disturbance cease; but as long as one has not been molested,
he must in turn leave the world unmolested, and the idea of a claim against
an innocent passerby who has not disturbed one at all is monstrous." Id. at 84.
It is submitted that duties could be defined in either way we choose, and
that the decision between alternative definitions is largely a matter of
convenience. We see no particular convenience in the qualification Kohler
suggests.
21. For a scholarly discussion of the philosophical basis of these relations,
expressed however without the precision made possible by Kocourek's
terminology, see Del Vecchio, op. cit. supra note 8, at f1 174.
"Law, as well as morals, has its principle in the nature or essence of
man. It is distinct from the latter, and constitutes a specific criterion of the
valuation and determination of acts, by the objectivity of the relation in
which it places and prdtects the absolute quality of personality. The possibility, proper to man, of living in a supra-sensible universe, and attaining,
in his consciousness of an absolute being, the reason of his deliberations
(a possibility which we have recognized as the basis of ethics in general),
acquires a specific juridical meaning when it appears as the criterion and
rule of all social relations. In this sense it is advanced as the maxim that
every man can, merely because he is man, advance a claim not to be forced
against his will into any relation with another. He can advance a claim not
to be used by anyone merely as a means or instrument. He can demand
respect, as he must give respect in return to the imperative: 'Do not extend
your caprice over others, do not aim to subject to yourself those who are
subject to themselves alone.' By this principle or idea-limit, of the properly
universal law of, personality, fixed and inexhaustible in every concrete
relation of society, all social relations must be measured and made, so that
each one of them, of whatsoever kind it may be, will bear its impress and will
presuppose and imply the recognition of the high worth of autonomous
being, of which it must be in fact an exercise or function."
22. See Korkunor, op. cit. supra note 7, at 220.
"The modern idea of right does not, however, admit the existence of
rights over the very person of a man. It admits only the existence of rights
to his services, and even these rights have very frequently no absolute
character."
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for inasmuch as the person alone is capable of preference between feelings (that is, of pleasure or pain), only by an effect
upon the person can pain be inflicted; and only when pain is
inflicted can a shift of well-being be predicted. Between persons
of "normal" status, therefore, there is no claim, on the part of
either, to exclude the other from external objects: And it might
appear that we could draw a sharp line, saying that one's claim
extends to all acts affecting his own person and does not extend
to any acts affecting other things.
Theoretically this is true, and practically it is acceptable in
the great majority of instances. But it is not as rigorous as it may
seem; for inasmuch as the "person" is casually connected with
external "effects," every act which produces an effect upon an
external object must inevitably produce at least a slight effect
upon the person of the other individual. It could therefore be
argued that a'claim to exclude another from affecting one's person is, in effect, a claim to exclude him from performing any act
whatsoever. An adequate answer to this difficulty would require
a separate article. For our present purposes, it must suffice to
point out that such effects are almost always negligible.
Under the ideal condition which we are now considering,
each individual has one claim, and only one-a claim to exclude
the other individual from in any way affecting him. Since this
claim, and the absence of every other type of claim, is implicit in
the fact that the status of each individual is "normal" (in the
sense that no increase or decrease in well-being can be expected)
it can be changed only by a change in the condition of one or both
individuals. It will be changed if either individual brings about
a change in his status either by (1) the exercise of a volition, or
(2) the enjoyment of a preference. We will here consider the
alterations which come about by the exercise of volition.
The exercise of volition is, in every instance, the performance of an act; and under the postulate an act may alter the
status of the actor so as to assure him of an increased measure
either of pleasure or of pain. In this way it may alter his relations.
Very clearly, there is no other way in which the individual may
exercise control over a relationship. In the everyday language
of our jurists, and even of our jural scholars, we find powers
referred to as though they were instruments of control over the
law itself, enabling the holder of the power to alter relations by
a purely mental determination. This belief, although harmless
enough, is based on a misconception. All that the individual can
ever do is to perform acts, and thus produce changes in the ex-
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ternal world. After he has done so, some law, either an invarient
principle such as we have postulated, or one of the uniformities
imposed by the positive law, determines what the effect will be
upon relations.
The basic power of the individual may be stated, therefofe,
as a power to perform acts. By the use of the table in Part I,
we see that the other individual must be under a correlative
liability to suffer (or submit to) acts: And indeed it is not difficult to observe independently that the actee is under a liability,
inasmuch as he must run the risk of having others injure him
or aid him by their acts, thus altering his status and relations.
Just as a claim to exclude others (from affecting one) is the only
claim which exists under the ideal condition here postulated, so
the power to perform acts is the only power. While our analysis
has referred to the power over the claim relation, or a power of
the first degree, it is not difficult to see that it is equally applicable to powers of a higher degree, i.e., to powers over the power
relation itself.
It may here be helpful to tabulate the basic relations which
we have thus far evolved.

Each
individual
has the
following
authorities

A claim
to exclude
the other
from
-affecting
one's person

A duty to
refrain from
affecting the
other's
person

A power to
perform
acts

A liability
to suffer
acts

-

Each
individual
has the
h e
preceding
responsibilities

The effect of an act is in every case a difference between
two conditions of the universe-the condition which does exist,
when the act is performed, and the condition which would exist
if the act were not performed. Expressed in another way, the
effect of an act is to create certain qualities (those which would
not exist but for it) and to destroy other qualities (those which
would exist but for it). Purely for purposes of illustration we
will discuss the situation which attends the creation of a group
12
of qualities sufficiently tangible to be called a concrete "object. 1
23. The creation of objects, by one person, is rare; and this has caused
some authorities to belittle the value of the principle here discussed.
"The right to appropriate what one has discovered is obviously of very
limited application in modern life; and the right to the full produce of one's
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The creation, or production, of an object always requires the
expenditure of a certain amount of exertion and therefore, if the
postulate be true, always assures the producer of receiving a
proportionate enhancement in his well-being. If, therefore, the
producer uses the object in accordance with his own preference,
and thereby receives an enhancement in well-being, the expected
has happened and no repercussions are to be anticipated. On the
other hand, if a different individual, ignoring the wishes (preference) of the producer, uses the object for his own purposes,
the pleasure he receives is uncalled for and will be compensated
by a corresponding diminution in his well-being at some future
time; and in such an event the producer, not having received the
enhancement in well-being of which his exertions assure him,
will receive it at some future time. 21 In other words, there will
be, at some future time, a shift of well-being from the party
using the object to the producer.
Inasmuch as this shift of well-being, from the user of the
object to the producer, is the criterion by which we recognize
the existence of a claim, we can describe the situation in the
language of relations by stating that the producer has a claim to
exclude others from using (or in any other way affecting) the
object he produces. It would not be very difficult to show that
this claim exists, not only in the case of objects, but in the case
of every quality which-is produced; although it is not of much
consequence except in the case of qualities which constitute
wealth and have value. 25 For this reason it is customary to
labor is practically meaningless in a society where the division of labor is
so complex that no one is ever in a position to tell what part of any objects
or contests a single individual could have produced or invented by his own
unaided labor." Cohen, Law and the Social Order (1933) 344.
Again, at page 51 of the same volume, Mr. Cohen states: "That everyone
is entitled to the full produce of his labor is assumed as self-evident, both
by socialists and by conservatives who believe that capital is the result of

the savings of labor. However, as economic goods are never the result of
any one man's unaided labor, our maxim is altogether inapplicable. How

shall we determine what part of the value of a table should belong to the
carpenter, to the lumber man, to the transport worker, to the policeman

who guarded'the place while the work was being done, and to the indefinitely
large numbers of others whose cooperation was necessary."

The answer, of course, is that by contract each craftsman sells, in
exchange for a daily wage, the claim he would otherwise have over the

quality he produces.
24. "The person is inviolable; and it alone Is inviolable. It

is inviolable

not only in the intimate sanctuary of consciousness, but in all its legitimate
manifestations, in its acts, in the product of its acts, even in the instruments
that it makes its own by using them. Therein is the foundation of the
sanctity of property." Fourteenth lecture in Cousin, The True, the Beautiful
and the Good (1854).
25. "In the acquisition of ownership, the principle follows of itself, that

if a man has put his work into a natural product, by transferring it from the
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describe the claim in general language by stating that the individual 26 has a claim to exclude 7 others from his property.8 The
same relationship, viewed from the standpoint of the duty, may
be described as a duty to refrain from affecting the property of
another.
In the preceding paragraphs we considered the qualities
which are produced by an act. Let us now turn to the qualities
which are destroyed-the qualities which would exist but for the
act. Here, too, our inquiry can be best illustrated by considering
the situation which attends the destruction of a group of qualities sufficiently tangible to be called a concrete "object."
The destruction of an object (the destructive "phase" of an
act) has been described as "the creation of nothing out of something." It begins with an object and ends with nothing at allnothing which can be the subject matter of a relation. If the object destroyed was not subject to the claim of another then,
when it is subjected to the preference of the actor by its destruction, there is no one who has been injured-no one to whom
well-being will flow. Therefore, by definition, there is no violaworld of nature to the world of universal human control, or by otherwise
increasing its usefulness, and intensifying its character as wealth, he can
demand that his relation to it should be nearer than that of others, because
he has put a part of his personality into it, and thus given it something of
himself.
"From this there follows the justification of acquisition of ownership by
taking possession, and by improvement, the principle being upheld that it is
not the amount of work that is of importance, but the usefulness resulting
from the work, that is, that the thing is made susceptible of human interests,
with greater or lesser advantages." Kohler, op. cit. supra note 19, at 128.
26. "It is not property in itself that has rights; it is the proprietor, it is
the person that stamps upon it, with its own character, its right and Its title."
Fourteenth lecture by Cousin, op. cit. supra note 24.
27. The physical ability to exclude others (i. e., to enforce the claim) is
the corporeal element of "possession," although the idea of possession has
been modified to some extent by convention.
"To be the possessor of an object a man must have it so far under his
control as to be able to exclude others from it, but for this purpose there Is no
need of actual contact. A soldier lying on the ground, with his rifle within
easy reach of him is in possession of the rifle. The purchaser of a quantity
of wheat is put into possession of it by being given the keys of the warehouse
in which it is stored, and the donee of an estate may take possession of the
whole by entering upon any one portion of it, or even by having the land
shown to him from some neighbouring point of view. A long succession of
writers has maintained that the possession in these cases is symbolical, or
fictitious, because acquired without contact; that the 'claves horrei' are, for
instance, a mere symbol of the warehouse and its contents. The error of
attributing this view to the Roman jurists was conclusively shown by
Savigny; and it obviously need never be resorted to if we accept, as the
corporeal element in possession, the power to exclude others from the use
of a thing, rather than any actual contact with it." Holland, The Elements of
Jurisprudence (1880) 124.
28. The word "property" is used in its popular sense as describing wealth
which the individual produces or acquires, as we shall see in Part IV, from
some other individual who has produced it.
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tion of a claim. For this reason we say the destruction of an
object (or, generally, the destruction of any quality) has no legal
consequence if the object is not subject to the claim of another.
But, if the object destroyed is subject to the claim of another
(i. e., is his "property") the case is otherwise. The creator of
the object suffers an unwarranted decrease2 9 in well-being when
he is deprived of the use of the object; and the one who destroys
the object, by subjecting it to his own preference, has enjoyed
an unwarranted enhancement of well-being. A shift of wellbeing must therefore be expected. If this shift of well-being is
made voluntarily by the actor, as by compensating the creator
of the object, no further repercussions need be expected: But if
it is not made voluntarily, and if the postulate be true, it must
nonetheless occur. For this reason it is proper to say that the
actor has a duty to make compensation. In more general language,
we may say that the individual is under a duty to make others
whole for any violation of their claims. The same relationship,
viewed from the standpoint of the creator of the object, may be
described as a claim to be made whole for any violation of one's
0s
claim
We are now in a position to elaborate our original statement
of the claim-duty relationship by incorporating the changes
which are introduced by the exercise of the "power to perform
acts." The result may be set forth in tabular form as follows:
1. To exclude
the other
from

Each
individual
has the
following
claims

affecting
one's person
or property
2. To be made
whole for any
violation of
one's claim

*

1. To refrain
from
affecting the
person or
property of
the other
2. To make
the other
whole for
any violation
of his claim

Each
individual
has the
preceding
duties

29. That is, a decrease not inferrable from the postulate.
30. This claim is often contrasted with the "claim to exclude" which
some authorities believe to be more "original."
"The two rights mentioned are essential to each other, and condition each
other. No transmuted or new right could arise unless there had been an
'original' one; and the test of the existence of the 'original' one is the
willingness of the court to transmute it into a new one. This fact, and the
essential difference in content between the two, are important elements in
the Hohfeldian system." Radin, supra note 9, at 1153. Quoted in Hall, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 506,
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The foregoing table shows what might be called the basic
claim-duty relationship existing between two individuals. The
entire jural picture from the standpoint of the one individual,
including both powers and claims, can be depicted succinctly
(and without detail) as follows:

J To exclude others

[Claim
Authorities

Atoi

CTo be made
whole

j[To create conditions

Power
To destroy conditions
It is not difficult to observe the symmetry of this system. The
exercise of a "power to create" may bring about a "claim to
exclude" or terminate a "duty to make whole." The exercise of
a "power to destroy," may conversely bring about a "duty to
make whole" or terminate a "claim to exclude."
IV
It sometimes happens that the holder of a legal relation,
positive or negative, represents to another person that if such
other person does as the holder wishes (i. e., acts in accordance
with the holder's preference, in a certain particular) then the
relation will not be exercised. A landlord, for example, may
state that he will not eject a delinquent tenant if he makes good
the rent. Such a representation is frequently made (by the
holder of a relation) in order to induce the other person so to
act; and not infrequently it is successful in inducing the action.
When successful, it increases the well-being of the holder of the
relation (because it causes his preference to be satisfied) and it
decreases the well-being of the other person"1 (because it causes
him to act in accordance, not with his own preference, but with
the preference of another-the holder of the relation).
31. The earlier scholars seemed to stress "reliance" a great deal more
than "injury," perhaps because disputes never arise in which injury is not
present. See, for example, 3 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence
(1863) 128.
"Why a promise is binding (abstraction made of the interest of third
parties). It binds, on account of the expectation excited in the promisee.
For which reason a mere policitation (that is, a promise made but not
accepted) is not binding; for a promise not accepted could excite no
anticipation. So of a promise obviously made in jest."
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In the following paragraphs we will explore the implications
of this matter 2 while confining our attention, in the interest of
simplicity, to the situation which exists when these two quantities of well-being are approximately equal; that is, to the case
where the holder of the relation, by inducing the performance of
the act, will receive about the same amount of pleasure as the
other person will receive by virtue of the fact that the relation
is not exercised. Put more simply, although with less rigor, it is
the situation which exists when the relation in question, and the
act induced, are substantially equal in value.
This is the situation which prevails in the great majority of
instances; for, if the relation were substantially more valuable
than the act, the holder would not be willing to forego exercising
it; and, if the act were substantially more valuable, it could not
be induced. Instances do occur when these values are not equal,
or even comparable, but such cases are less convenient for study
since they introduce awkward perturbations without adding
anything whatever to the discussion which will here follow.
Assuming therefore, that the relation and the act are roughly
on equal value, let us consider the situation which exists when a
claimant has represented that his claim will not be exercised
and the duty-ower, by means of this representation, has been
induced to act. What will happen thereafter if the claimant
attempts to exercise his claim (by requiring the performance of
whatever act it concerns) and the duty-ower, by refusing so to
act, violates the claim?
The claimant would ordinarily be assured of receiving a
certain amount of well-being by virtue of his claim and therefore, if the claim were violated under ordinary circumstances,
could look forward to receiving some future enhancement in
well-being. But here he has already received an equivalent
amount of well-being by virtue of the act which he induced the
duty-ower to perform. His status after the violation is therefore
what we might call "normal." The duty-ower, in like manner,
upon violating the relation, would ordinarily look forward to a
32. The philosophical basis of transfer or "contract" (the form in which
the idea is ordinarily encountered) is much more complicated than the
everyday rule of positive law under which a promise is simply and

categorically

enforced without

well-being, etc.

much reference

to inducement,

shift of

This convenient rule of positive law is, however, a rule of

thumb adopted late in the history of civilization in order to facilitate the
trade structure of a developing world. Even today it is less precise than
we usually suppose. Consider, for example, the way the doctrine of

"consideration" has been evolved in order to invalidate attempted transfers
in which no real modification of the party's station occur.
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certain decrease in his well-being. But here he has already
suffered an equivalent decrease by virtue of the act which he
was induced to perform. Thus his well-being, too, is now "normal." Since the status of each person is normal, there will be
no shift of well-being from the duty-ower to the claimant and
therefore, as our definition of claim will verify, there is no claim
in existence. It disappeared upon the performance the act which
had been induced.
In order to describe this situation, without setting forth the
complexities inherent in it, it is customary to resort to figurative
language and to say that the original claim has been "relinquished" by the holder. It will be immediately obvious that
there is no corresponding way in which a duty can be relinquished.
Repeating our assumption that the relations and the act are
roughly of equal value, let us turn now to the situation which
exists when an individual who is not under a duty has represented that his privilege 3 to act as he pleases will not be exercised
(that is, that he will act in accordance with the preference of the
other party) and the other' party, the holder of no claim, by
means of this representation has been induced to act. What will
happen thereafter if the individual making the representation
attempts to exercise his privilege (by acting in accordance with
his own preference rather than the preference of the other
party) and the person induced by the representation, by attempting to require a different action, expresses his disapproval.
The holder of the privilege would ordinarily be exempt from
the necessity of performing any particular act at the behest of
the other party, and therefore, if he had acted in accordance
with his own preference, under ordinary circumstances, would
not have to look forward to any particular shift in well-being.
But here he has already received an amount of well-being equivalent in value to his privilege by virtue of the act which he
induced the duty-ower to perform. When, therefore, he proceeds to exercise his privilege, he is receiving an additional
enhancement in his well-being beyond the amount indicated by
the postulate. The person induced by the representation, in like
manner, upon the exercise of the privilege by the other party,
would ordinarily look forward to a certain decrease in his
well-being. But here he has already suffered an equivalent
decrease by virtue of the act which he was induced to perform;
33. "Privilege" is the word ordinarily used to describe the non-existence
of a duty.
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so that, upon the exercise of the privilege, his well-being is
decreased beyond the point which would be indicated by the
postulate. Since the exercise of the privilege will leave the wellbeing of the holder of the privilege higher than it should be, and
will leave, the well-being of the person induced lower than it
should be, there will be a shift of well-being from the holder of
the privilege to the person induced; and therefore, as our definition will verify, there is a claim-duty in existence.
In order to describe this situation, without setting forth the
complexities inherent in it, it is customary to resort to figurative
language and to say that the original privilege has been "relinquished" by the holder.3 4 This is, of course, exactly the same as
to say that a claim has been "conferred" upon the other party.
It will be immediately obvious that there is no corresponding
way in which a duty can be conferred.
In the preceding discussion we have used the word "relinquishment" to describe the process by which an existing claim
(in one's favor) is terminated, and we have used the word "conferment" to describe the process by which a claim (against one)
is brought into being. While it is important to preserve a clear
understanding of the process which is involved, we can greatly
simplify our further discussion if we adopt the word "transfer"
as a shorthand expression to describe both processes, relinquishment and conferment. The transfer of a claim will then signify
either the relinquishment of one's own claim or the conferment
of a claim upon another. The preceding situation as it exists
before the transfer will almost always show which type of transfer is intended; and any possible ambiguity can be speedily
resolved by reverting to the original terms "relinquishment"
and "conferment." This use of the word "transfer" will be found
to coincide very nearly, if not precisely, with the popular meaning of that term. It will readily be apparent that, since there is
no way to confer or to relinquish a duty, there is no way to
"transfer" a duty.
34. This is sometimes amplified by averring that the principle of
utility requires one's word to be kept inviolate.
See 1 Bentham, Theory of Legislation (1840) 104.
"Why ought we to fullflll our engagements? Because the faith of promises is the basis of society. It is for the advantage of all that the promises
of every Individual should be faithfully observed. There would no longer be
any security among men, no commerce, no confldence;-it would be necessary
to go back to the woods, if engagements did not possess an obligatory force.
It is the same with these political contracts. It is their utility which makes
them binding. When they become injurious, they lose their force . . . it
cannot be denied then, that the validity of a contract is at bottom only a
question of utility, a little wrapped up, a little disguised, and In consequence,
more susceptible of false interpretations."
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It is possible to arbitrarily divide relations into two groups
which might be roughly described as comprising (1) those relations which are of advantage to the holder and (2) those which
are of disadvantage to the holder. In order to make the separation methodical, let us adopt as our criterion the following test
"does the exercise of the relation enable the holder to have his
own preference satisfied, rather than the preference of the other
party?" If so, it is a relation of advantage; and, conversely, if not,
it is a relation of disadvantage. It is at once obvious that relations
of advantage can only lead to an enhancement of the holder's
well-being, and that those of disadvantage can only lead to a
diminution; but this fact is not of particular importance to
our study.
It is clear that all claims are relations of advantage since, by
definition, they give the holder the authority to require an act
of another person. If the act is performed the preference of the
holder is satisfied, and if it is not performed, the claim assures
him of an equivalent satisfaction. Thus a claim can only lead
to an enhancement of the holder's well-being-a satisfaction of
his preference. By the same token, all duties are relations of
disadvantage.
While at first scrutiny it might appear that all powers are
relations of advantage, further consideration will reveal that
powers, unlike claims, have no direct connection with the preference, and thereby the well-being, of the holder. Powers influence
the well-being of the holder only indirectly, through the claimduty relations which they ultimately bring about. We may,
therefore, conclude that they are of advantage, or of disadvantage, depending upon whether their exercise will result in the
creation of a claim against or in favor of the holder of the power.
This may be expressed somewhat more-tersely by stating that
(1) Powers to acquire claims from others are relations of advantage, and that (2) Powers to transfer claims to others are relations of disadvantage. Similarly, (1) Liabilities to receive claims
from others are relations of advantage and (2) Liabilities to
forfeit claims to others are relations of disadvantage.
Not to lose ourselves in the complexities of this situation, we
may adopt a tabular method of setting forth the entire matter.
The following diagram represents a classification of all authorityresponsibility relations. Relations of advantage are shown in
capitals, while those of disadvantage appear in italics.
In the preceding paragraphs we investigated the method by
which a claim may be transferred, and we discovered that the
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individual has a power to transfer any claim whatever. A similar
investigation would disclose that this power of transfer extends
not only to claims but to all relations of advantage, i. e., to claims
plus powers to acquire claims. We will, however, dispense with
this investigation because it is too tedious to be of interest. To
summarize the matter we may state, however, that the individual has a power to transfer relations of advantage, and correspondingly has a liability to receive relations of advantage.
For the sake of completeness we will now summarize, in tabular form, the authority-responsibility relationships which would
logically follow from the postulate we are considering:

A Claim

-

1. To
exclude
the other
from
affecting
one's
person or
property

2. To be
Authorities

2. To make
the other
whole
for any
Responsibilities
violation
of his
claim

made
whole
for any
violation
of one's
claim
A Power
1. To
perform
acts
2. To
transfer
relations
of advantage

A Duty
1. To
refrain
from
affecting
the
other's
person or
property

-

A Liability
1. To
suffer
acts
2. To
receive
relations
of advantage

It requires no high degree of insight to observe that the
system of relations set forth in the foregoing tabulation is the
system toward which positive law, in the more enlightened
countries, tends to conform.
Without pausing to state the numerous qualifications which
may suggest themselves, it is possible to point out in brief fashion
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the particular branch of law which is based upon each of these
fundamental authorities. The claim to exclude others from one's
person is, of course, the basis of the law of personal injuries;
just as the claim to exclude from one's productions is the basis
of the law of property. Upon the claim to be made whole, we
base our law of damages. The power to perform acts has, as its
two-fold aspect, the power to create objects, and thus to create
property; and at the same time to destroy objects, and thus to
commit torts. The power to transfer relations is, rather clearly,
the source of contract. Thus, the tabulated relations find their
place in the main departments of civil law.
There are, of course, in the positive law, additional relations
imposed by the State for specific purposes: But it is difficult to
find any instance in which the relations here set forth are not
imposed; and it is impossible to find any instance in which the
opposite relations are sanctioned. It is, therefore, reasonably
clear that the State is striving, for whatever reason, to enforce'
the very relations that follow from our postulate-that it has,
for all practical purposes, decided to proceed on the assumption
that the postulate is true.
But is it true, or is the assumption of its truth a general
error into which all men have fallen? It has been suggested that
a partial answer to this question may be found by investigating
those instances in which the results produced by the positive law
do not coincide with those indicated by the postulate. This may
require a word of explanation.
The relations which the State seeks to enforce are not the
same as those which it actually does enforce. Its announced
purpose, its statutes and customs, are sometimes successfully
evaded in practice. There is, therefore, a difference between the
announced purpose of the State (the statutes and customs) and
the positive law (the relations which are successfully enforced).
The relations set forth in our .tabulation correspond to the
announced purpose of the State, but do not, in all instances,
correspond to the positive law. For example, the relations set
forth in the tabulation include the proposition that a claim-duty
relationship exists between A and B under which A has a claim
that B shall refrain from robbing him, and B has a duty so to
refrain. The announced purpose of the State is to impose a
similar relationship on each of its citizens. To some extent it is
successful: But certain citizens who commit robberies succeed in
avoiding the announced penalties, and their victims fail to receive
compensation.
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In such cases, the'table of relations' set forth herein indicates
that well-being will shift from the robber to the victim: But
the positive law does not shift it. Will it shift in some other way?
If it will, and not otherwise, the truth of the postulate will bein a measure-confirmed, and found to be independent of the
positive law; and the attempt of the positive law to conform will
be revealed as a necessity of nature, rather than a mere coincidence or caprice.
It therefore becomes desirable to ascertain whether or not
well-being will shift in this (and other) cases, in accordance
with the tabulation of relations, when the State does not cause
the shift. The traditional method of ascertaining this fact would
be to conduct an experiment; to have B injure A; to withhold
action by the positive law; and then to observe whether or not A
was punished and B compensated by nature in some other
fashion.
Unfortunately, the difficulties which are encountered in
measuring the magnitude" of conation and affection, and the
popular feeling against experimentation in human welfare, unite
to bar this field of inquiry. A few scientists have attempted to
investigate such problems by statistical methods, hoping that,
although no ideal situation can be set up by experiment, they
may be able to establish whether robbers, for example, are, in
the average instance, punished by nature when for some reason
they are not punished by the positive law. All of these investigations, however, are in their early stages, and have not yet
advanced far enough to justify any extensive speculation as to
their results.
This, then, is a field for future cultivation. If science succeeds
in developing a technique for measuring the exact quantum of
well-being present in a given individual at a given time, as it
can now measure the quantum of matter or energy, it seems
reasonable to suppose that our descendants will be able definitely
to proe or disprove postulates such as we have here considered;
and to discover the correct correlation between conation and
35. We are now able to measure conation and affection as intensive, but
not as extensive, magnitudes. We can tell whether a change in one's wellbeing, for example, is an increase or a decrease, but we cannot compute the
amount which the change represents. In this respect, the measurement of
conation and affection stands today about where the measurement of heat
stood before Joule discovered the mechanical equivalent of the calorie and
thus enabled science to measure heat in terms of ergs, under the wellestablished gram-centimetre-second system. It is interesting to note that
Einstein, by discovering the mechanical equivalent of mass, has since enabled
us to measure heat directly in terms of grams. Another Joule, and another
Einstein, in another age, may do the same thing for mental phenomena.
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affection, if one exists. Such a discovery, more than anything
else which can be readily imagined, by placing law among the
descriptive sciences, will remove it from the realm of the mystic
and the magical. Until the discovery is made, however, the
cautious man will hesitate to dogmatize, either way, concerning
the feasibility of a natural science of law.

